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Abstract
We model the set of tenure-track faculty members at a university as a queue, where “customers” in
queue are faculty members in active careers. Arrivals to the queue are usually young, untenured
assistant professors, and departures from the queue are primarily those who do not pass a
promotion or tenure hurdle and those who retire. There are other less-often-used ways to enter and
leave the queue. Our focus is on system effects of the elimination of mandatory retirement age. In
particular, we are concerned with estimating the number of assistant professor slots that annually
are no longer available because of the elimination of mandatory retirement. We start with steady-
state assumptions that require use of Little’s Law of Queueing, and we progress to a transient
model using system dynamics. We apply these simple models using available data from our home
university, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Introduction
Education represents one of our most important service sectors, with approximately 10% of
the U.S. gross domestic product devoted to education. Effective management of faculty and
staff is a key element of successful education service systems. In this paper our focus is on
university faculties and on one very specific topic: retirement. Our analysis brings to this
problem a classic tool of service systems analysis, queueing theory, born approximately 100
years ago in Denmark.
Faculty members at universities and colleges enjoy a rare job benefit: tenure. Academic
tenure in higher education was established in the late 1800s as a measure of protection for
faculty against dismissal for exercising freedom of speech and inquiry (Keast 1973). If they
successfully navigate the professional hurdles of reappointment and promotion leading to
the granting of tenure, faculty members enjoy job security until they retire. Federal rules
regarding the age of retirement have been prescribed over the past 45 years by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (Pub. L. 90-202) (ADEA), as amended from
time to time. Until 1982, retirement of faculty members at many universities was mandatory
at age 65. Because of amendments to the ADEA, in 1982 the minimum allowable mandatory
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retirement age was increased to age 70. In 1986 Congress made additional amendments to
the ADEA, prohibiting any mandatory retirement ages for most workers in the United
States.
The philosophy behind these amendments was that individuals should be judged not for their
age but for their skills and knowledge (Hammond 1991). Such legislation raised important
questions in the field of higher education and particularly in research universities, where
mandatory retirement was an integral component of human resource policy for academic
personnel (Clark 2001). As a result, the issue was put out for analysis, and ending
mandatory retirement ages for university faculty members was delayed. Then in 1994
mandatory retirement for faculty members was finally prohibited in all U.S. colleges and
universities.
Previous studies have demonstrated an increase in the expected age at which faculty retire
after the ADEA amendments came into force (Ashenfelter 2002). In this paper we estimate
the first-order effects of nonmandatory retirement age on the number of new faculty slots
available in a typical research institution. The first step will be to outline and model a simple
“back-of-the-envelope” procedure, which will then serve as the basis for more detailed and
complex models.
Background
Given the restrictions that arise from tenure, mandatory retirement provided universities
with flexibility to hire new faculty in developing fields. To better understand the
implications of the 1986 ADEA amendments, Congress postponed their implementation in
higher education and commissioned a study to determine their broader effects in academia.
This permitted colleges and universities to continue requiring tenured faculty members to
retire at age 70 until 1994, when the final decision was to be made in light of the study’s
recommendations. The study, carried out by the Committee on Mandatory Retirement in
Higher Education at the National Research Council (NRC), concluded that at most colleges
and universities, few tenured professors would continue working past age 70 if mandatory
retirement were to be eliminated (Hammond 1991). Consequently, the main
recommendation to Congress was that mandatory retirement of tenured faculty should be
allowed to expire at the end of 1993. The NRC committee also recommended that Congress
and regulatory agencies assist research universities in minimizing the potential adverse
effects of eliminating mandatory retirement for tenured faculty.
For research universities, the committee pointed out that if mandatory retirement were to be
eliminated, a high proportion of tenured faculty would choose to work past age 70
(Hammond 1991). This analysis concluded that research-oriented faculty who enjoyed
inspiring students and had light teaching loads were more likely to work past age 70. This
outcome was also foreseen by Rees and Smith (1991) and later confirmed by Ashenfelter
(2002). The NRC report argued that abolishing mandatory retirement would reduce faculty
turnover, reducing the continual faculty reinvigoration that helps these institutions maintain
the cutting edge of American science. Lower retiring rates would limit hiring and promotion
of new faculty with new views and new areas of research. In addition, continued
employment of older and usually higher-salaried professors could result in increased costs
and financial difficulties.
Confirming the committee’s forecasts, Ashenfelter (2002) found that after 1994, the fraction
nationally of 60-year-olds who worked until 73 had risen to about 10% and to 30% and
higher at some private research universities. While analyzing the University of North
Carolina (UNC), Clark and Ghent (2008) found that its two research institutions had lower
retirement rates than the other types of institutions in the UNC system. Regarding the impact
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of institutions’ overall academic quality on retirement patterns, Rees and Smith, in 1991,
concluded that retirement age tended to be higher with higher SAT scores of entering
students. Subsequent to Rees and Smith’s work and the abolishment of mandatory
retirement age, the national percentage of tenured professors age 70 years and older
increased threefold to 2.1% between 1992 and 2006. At the Harvard University Faculty of
Arts and Sciences, the increase during the same period was from 0% to 9.1% (Bombardieri
2006). Despite the lack of recent data regarding the current average age of retiring faculty at
leading research universities, the available studies suggest that it has indeed increased
significantly.
In light of the impacts of the ADEA amendments, the following analysis will implement
simple modeling techniques to describe how new faculty slots are reduced after the
elimination of mandatory retirement. Any college or university can use the modeling
methods to obtain first-order back-of-the-envelope estimates of the effect of no mandatory
retirement age. To illustrate, we apply them with limited available data to our institution—
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).
Intuition
At first glance, one might think that ending mandatory retirement results only in a transient
effect, where the number of new faculty slots available is reduced until the system returns to
steady state. Steady state requires that the total number of faculty members remains
approximately fixed over time, and that has been the case at MIT for at least three decades—
with approximately 1,000 tenure-track faculty members across the university’s five schools.
In addition, steady state requires that the number of departures from the faculty balances the
number of new faculty hires in any given year. Suddenly terminating mandatory retirement
at age 65 or at age 70 would indeed create strong transient effects, as older faculty members
who had been scheduled to retire decide not to do so, thereby reducing the near-term number
of new faculty slots available for assistant professors. However, as our analysis will show,
once steady state sets in, the number of new faculty hires is permanently reduced by the
cessation of a mandatory retirement age.
Applying Little’s Law
To understand the effects of nonmandatory retirement age on new faculty hiring, we apply
Little’s Law of Queueing from operations research:
(1)
where
L = the time-average number of “customers” in the queueing system,
λ = average rate at which new customers enter the system, and
W = the average time spent in the system by a random customer who enters.
Little’s Law applies to any queueing system operating in steady state (Little 1961). The
relationship does not require Markovian or other simplifying structural assumptions and is
valid independent of probability distributions involved. It has stood the test of time, as
discussed in a recent historical overview article celebrating its 50th anniversary (Little
2011). In application to university faculties, we have the following correspondences:
L = the time-average number of tenure-track faculty members employed by the
university,
λ = average annual rate at which new tenure-track faculty members join the faculty, and
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W = the average number of years spent on the faculty by a newly hired assistant
professor.
For this initial analysis, we focus only on tenure-track appointments and ignore more senior
faculty appointments above rank of assistant professor. We believe that ours is the first
application of Little’s Law to college and university faculties.
To apply Equation (1), we need to estimate W, the average number of years spent on the
faculty by a typical new assistant professor. To do this, we think of the key decision points
made for and by this faculty member as she or he proceeds through her or his career. A
typical career trajectory involves the following milestones:
1. At the end of year 2, reappointment as assistant professor without tenure.
2. At the end of year 4, appointment as associate professor without tenure.
3. At the end of year 7, appointment as associate professor with tenure.
4. Remaining on the faculty until retirement, not voluntarily departing from the
university at some preretirement time, most often associated with a faculty or
business appointment elsewhere.
5. Retirement from the faculty.
Milestone 4 is not really a specific time-marked event. It is included to account for those
faculty, typically in their 40s or 50s, who voluntarily leave to become deans, provosts, and
presidents at other universities or to engage full time in some business activity. At MIT, an
example is Dr. Robert Brown, once provost of MIT, who left in 2005 at age 54 to become
president of Boston University. Another example is Dr. Lawrence Bacow, once chancellor at
MIT, who in 2001 at age 49 became president of Tufts University.
Let us denote
Then, of course, (1 − Pi) is the conditional probability that milestone i is not achieved, given
that milestone (i − 1) is achieved. We assume that if any reappointment, promotion, or
tenure decision (milestone 1, 2, or 3, respectively) is unsuccessful, institutions allow the
affected faculty member to remain on the faculty for one more year after that negative
decision to allow time for that individual to identify and solidify alternative career paths. We
assume that the new faculty slot created by such a negative decision opens up only after the
individual has left the institution’s faculty. For the sake of simplicity, we will also assume
that P5 = 1, meaning that any tenured professor who does not voluntarily leave the faculty
eventually retires with probability 1.
For the times associated with milestones, we define for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
Table 1 provides estimates of the milestone probabilities using available data from a select
research institution in the United States (MIT 2010). Initially, mortality rates are not taken
into account. In Table 1, we show the estimated numerical values for P1 and P4 with an
asterisk because MIT does not possess reliable university-averaged data for these
parameters. They represent best estimates at this time and may be subject to correction at
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some future point. The rightmost column of Table 1 displays numerical values for the Yis,
the number of years from appointment as assistant professor to the achievement of each
respective milestone, assuming first hire at age 30 and mandatory retirement at age 65.
The general equation for W, the mean time spent on the faculty by a randomly hired
assistant professor, is given by
(2)
The intuition is as follows: The first term reflects the fact that each new faculty hire will,
with probability 1, spend at least Y1 years on the faculty. The second term accounts for
those faculty who are reappointed as assistant professor and as a result spend a time at least
equal to (Y2 − Y1) additional years on the faculty. Similar milestone arguments support the
third, fourth, and fifth terms. The sixth and final term corresponds to those faculty members
who do not obtain tenure and who drop out at any of the first three milestone points.
Because the fraction of faculty members who do obtain tenure is the product of the success
probabilities associated with the first three milestones—that is, P1P2P3—the fraction who do
not obtain tenure is (1 − P1P2P3). Each such individual spends one additional year on the
faculty after failure to achieve the milestone, that year devoted to career planning. So, in
effect, the sixth term is multiplied by “one year.”
Now let us compute W with the data described above, and assume that each new faculty
member hired is 30 years old and that mandatory retirement occurs at age 65. Using the
numbers from Table 1 and Equation (2), we can write
or
These calculations suggest that, with a mandatory retirement age of 65, and given all of the
assumptions regarding milestone probabilities, the average career time spent on the faculty
by a random newly hired 30-year-old assistant professor is 17.64 years.
We now substitute this number into Little’s Law and obtain the average new assistant
professor faculty hires per year:
Now suppose that we abolish mandatory retirement at age 65. This affects the fifth term in
Equation (2). As mentioned previously, there is widespread evidence that the average age of
faculty at leading research universities has increased markedly since 1994, suggesting an
increase in the average retirement age. Even though there are no recent data on this statistic,
75 years is likely to be an upper bound at most universities. Let us assume then, for the sake
of illustration, that the average age of retirement increases from 65 to 75 after the
abolishment of mandatory retirement. This increase changes Y5 in the fifth term from 35 to
45, yielding an average career time spent on faculty of 21.56 years.
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That is, given the model’s assumptions, termination of mandatory retirement at age 65
increases the mean number of years that a newly hired assistant professor spends on the MIT
faculty from 17.64 to 21.56 years, an increase of about 22%. We now substitute this into
Little’s Law, retaining 1,000 total faculty members as constant, and we obtain for the
revised annual rate of new faculty hires
The figure of 46 new assistant professor faculty hires per year represents a reduction of
about 19% compared to the retire-at-65 policy with 57 new hires per year. That is, about 11
would-be new appointments, over all of MIT, would not be made because of the increase in
retirement age. This is a steady-state result, indicating that effects far beyond transient
effects are at play here.
The equation “λW = constant” implies that an X% increase in W (mean length of a faculty
career) requires a compensating reduction in λ, the rate of annual hires of assistant
professors. This demonstrates that our initial intuition was quite incorrect.
To improve our intuition, let us move to an extreme. Suppose there exists a university whose
faculty could only be faculty members for one year. If the total number of faculty members
were 1,000, then 1,000 new hires would be made each year because there would be 1,000
departures each year. But now suppose that the length of a faculty career were doubled to
two years. Then, on average, only half of the 1,000 faculty members would depart each year,
so the number of new hires would correspondently halve to 500. Although this is an extreme
and unrealistic example, the same logic applies in more realistic settings: an X percentage
increase in faculty career length requires a compensating reduction in the rate of new faculty
hires.
More formally, suppose that we have for a given mandatory retirement age
Now we increase W0 by X%. We can write
where λ′ is the new steady-state hiring rate for junior faculty members. Solving for λ′, we
find
(3)
Equation (3) confirms that if W is doubled, λ is halved. If X = 22%, as in our numerical
example, Equation (3) reaffirms that λ is reduced by a factor 1/[1 + 0.22] = 1/1.22 ≈ 0.82, or
18%. Equation (3) can be used by university administrators to obtain a first-order
approximation to the effect on new faculty hiring of increased age at retirement.
Generalizing the arguments leading to Equation (3), one can, in a straightforward manner,
add lateral entries of faculty hires and other complexities. These computations can be
applied to subsets of university faculties, such as faculty members in individual schools or
academic departments. And they can be applied by gender and/or demographic attributes.
But we must recall that application of these simple arguments requires a steady state or
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equilibrium in numbers. When that is not the case, the time-dependent modeling of system
dynamics is more appropriate.
Accounting for Mortality and Lateral Hires
Two major omissions in the simple procedure previously outlined are impacts of mortality
rates and lateral hires. Death is an event that can occur prior to a retirement decision and
therefore is important to include in the analysis. Similarly, lateral hires will reduce the
availability of new assistant professor hires per year.
Research shows that on average, people with higher education attainment live longer lives in
the United States. Given that professors at research universities have attained the highest
levels of education, using aggregate U.S.-wide mortality rates is not appropriate for this
analysis. Instead, we use average mortality rates for highly educated individuals taken from
the Social Security Administration (2007), weighted by college-educated averages from
Brown et al. (2002).
In an expanded version of our model, we find that the addition of mortality rates reduces the
average length of time W spent as a tenured professor, assuming a mandatory retirement age
of 65, from 17.6 years to 17.3 years. This equates roughly to one additional new hire per
year—from 57 hires per year to 58 hires per year. When the mandatory retirement age is
abolished and we use an average retirement age of 75, the mortality tables suggest that, on
average, about two preretirement faculty members will pass away each year. The effect
would be to change λ from 46 to about 48 new hires per year.
Although MIT does not track the number of faculty that depart yearly from death, these
figures seem reasonably consistent with general estimates of the number of faculty members
passing away per year. Not surprisingly, as the average retirement age increases, increased
mortality rates in the older population have a greater effect on the number of new faculty
hires.
Adding lateral hires to our analysis is straightforward. One basically thinks of two queues or
pools of faculty members: those hired as new assistant professors and those brought to the
university at a later stage in their careers, some with and some without tenure. In that case
Equation (1) is expanded to have two terms on the right-hand side of the equation, λ1W1
and λ2W2L/W, the first representing new assistant professor hires and the second
representing lateral hires. These terms are added, and the analysis proceeds in a
straightforward way. In this paper we do not attempt to expand our illustrative numerical
results to include lateral hires due primarily to data limitations of our home university, MIT.
Although some lateral hires do occur at MIT, the great preponderance of faculty hires is new
assistant professors. Finally, depending on details, a few moments of thought will reveal that
lateral hires may increase or decrease W, the mean time that a random faculty member
remains on the faculty. In either case, the effect on the hiring rate of new assistant professors
is that of a net reduction.
System Dynamics Modeling
The previous analysis was focused on a steady-state condition, estimating changes in the
faculty-hiring rate as a result of retirement age policy change after a sufficiently long time
period when system inputs and outputs are in balance. In this section, we take a further step
by analyzing what will happen during the transition to a new steady-state level, and how the
number of faculty members and the hiring rate change after implementing a new retirement
policy. For such a purpose, we develop a model using system dynamics.
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System dynamics is a computer-aided deterministic simulation technique that can be used to
analyze the behavior of a complex social system over time (Sterman 2000, Forrester 1968).
The “stock and flow” structure that serves as the basic construct in system dynamics
provides an appropriate platform to model the behavior of faculty hiring and retirement
while accounting for the delays in each of these processes. In addition, system dynamics
models are framed graphically—aiding intuition—and produce visual output, showing how
changes in retirement policies affect the behavior of the system over time.
Figure 1 represents the model structure built for this analysis. This simple model consists of
a single stock, employed professors (L), with two explicit inflows and two explicit outflows.
The two inflows are incoming assistant professors (I1) and lateral hires (I2), and the two
outflows are exit (O1) and death (O2). The dropout rate for professors who voluntarily leave
before retirement is embedded in W, the average number of years that faculty remain
employed.
The model uses Little’s Law to determine the rate of retirement (O1), and the death rate (O2)
is estimated to be at 0.1% of the employed professor pool. Equations (4) and (5) represent
the outflows:
(4)
(5)
The average number of years that faculty members remain employed (W) is calculated using
the same probability model outlined previously. The number of employed professors (L) at
any given time changes by hiring and exiting rates. Mathematically, we have a first-order
differential equation:
(6)
In this equation, assistant professor hiring (I1) is the main inflow. In equilibrium, where a
university has the desired number of professors, a university’s normal yearly hiring rate (N)
should be equal to what it expects the net exit rate will be (O1 + O2 − I2). In other words, to
ensure that the total number of faculty members remains constant, the university’s normal
hire rate (N) should be equal to its net exit rate (O1 + O2 − I2). We define N as a lagged
variable of the exit rate (with delay of τ), to represent the fact that it takes time for a
university to observe a sudden change in the exit rate:
(7)
The subscripts represent time.1 A hiring rate of I1 = N will balance the hiring with the exit
rate and eventually bring the number of faculty members to a steady-state level. However,
when a university decides to grow, it needs to hire an additional number of faculty members
to fill the gap between the number of current faculty members (L) and the desired number of
faculty members (L*). The rate of additional hiring depends on the time that it takes to
implement the development policy and equals (L* − L)/τ. Therefore, the total yearly hiring
rate that accounts for both the normal exit rate and the desired level of-professors is as
follows:
1Consistent with the system dynamics approach, a first-order smooth function is used to represent the delay; i.e., N = Smooth(O1 +
O2 − I2, τ).
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(8)
where I1 is nonnegative (I1 ≥ 0).2
The remaining inflow, yearly lateral hiring rate (I2), is estimated according to the available
data at 0.1% of the employed faculty pool:
(9)
Preliminary Model Validation
The model was calibrated using historical data on the number of faculty employed at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology between 1980 and 2010. There were two major
shocks to the system during this period. The first was in 1994, when federal law lifted
mandatory retirement. The second shock happened in 1996, when a special, one-time early
retirement incentive program was offered to MIT employees (MIT 1995). Many higher-
education institutions have implemented similar programs to address the mentioned
drawbacks of removing mandatory retirement (Kim 2003). By 2007, institutions offering
retirement incentives had increased to 57% from 35% in 1987 (Chronister and Kepple
1987).
Inserting a step function in the retirement age variable at time t = 1994 reflects the sudden
removal of mandatory retirement by permanently increasing retirement age from 65 to a
modeled 75. We use the age of 75 for modeling purposes, recognizing that there is in fact no
mandatory retirement age. Similarly, inserting a pulse function in the exit rate at t = 1996
reflects the sudden retirement of faculty members who accepted the incentive offered during
that year. It is worth noting that even though both of these shocks are immediate, the built-in
delays and the exponential smoothing structures in the model allow the system to respond
gradually, as it would in reality. In other words, the stepwise increase in retirement age does
not result in a stepwise increase in the average duration of the fifth milestone, or in the
average time that faculty remain employed. Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate these two shocks.
To calibrate multiple variables such as the time to hire new faculty and the retirement
adaptation delay, a Powell hill-climbing algorithm is used for optimization. This
optimization engine is integrated into the system dynamics software package used to build
the model.3 Using this optimization algorithm in conjunction with manual tuning provides
satisfactory outcomes, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3(a) illustrates the behavior of the model (blue) compared to actual data (red) if the
target faculty size is held constant at 1,000 throughout the simulation period. Figure 3(b)
shows the same comparison, relaxing the assumption that the desired faculty size at MIT
remains constant. Table 2 summarizes the fitted parameters along with their R-squared
measure of goodness of fit. These results provide an initial validation of the model’s
integrity.
2Equivalently, I1 = max[N + (L* − L)/τ, 0].3Vensim DSS for Macintosh Version 5.11. Copyright 1988–2010. Ventana Systems, Inc., Harvard, MA.
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Simulation Results
Now we can run the model and examine the isolated effects of removing mandatory
retirement in 1994. The policy is operationalized in a similar way that was explained in the
previous section: by changing the retirement age at 1994 from 65 to 75.
Figure 4 shows the simulation results. In this figure we can compare variables in the
simulation run, which includes the change in policy, with a counterfactual base run. The
base run represents a situation with no change in retirement policy and an employed
professor pool remaining constant at 1,000. We can see from Figure 4(a) that the number of
new assistant professor hires per year starts declining in 1994 from 57 until reaching a new
equilibrium at around 46 almost two decades later. This hiring behavior reflects what
happens with the faculty exit rate (see Figure 4(b)). The number of years that individuals
remain in the employed professors stock starts to increase from 17.64 years in 1994 until
reaching a new equilibrium point at around 21 years, approximately two decades after the
restriction is lifted (see Figure 4(c)). Finally, in Figure 4(d), we see that the pool of
employed professors starts to increase once the policy is implemented and then starts to
decrease gradually until it eventually returns to its target size. This increase in faculty size is
what would have taken place at MIT had the early retirement incentive program not been
implemented.
The results from the system dynamics simulation provide insight on the time required by
similar systems to reach new equilibrium levels. We see that these adjustment periods are
nontrivial, and accounting for their duration provides a more complete model to understand
the impact of changes in retirement policies.
Discussion
Quantitative models such as the ones described in this paper hold the potential to assist
human resources departments when determining hiring and retirement policies in academic
institutions. Being able to forecast the time it takes for specific academic workforce systems
to recover from sudden changes is critical when determining these policies. External shocks,
such as legislation that prohibits mandatory retirement, should be accompanied by internal
policies targeted at smoothing the effects of these disruptions.
MIT responded to the ADEA amendments first enforced in 1994 in part through the 1996
retirement incentive program. This program resulted in the departure of a considerable
number of faculty in a relatively short time, causing a sharp drop in the number of employed
faculty from which it took MIT several years to recover. In contrast, MIT’s most recent
retirement incentive program, known as the Faculty Renewal Program, spans a three-year
period (Pfeiffer 2009). By spreading out the time period during which participants become
eligible, this program addresses the shortcomings encountered after 1996 as illustrated in our
system dynamics model. This recent initiative also offers flexibility regarding the actual date
of retirement, further reducing the potential for sudden shocks to the system.
The system dynamics model developed for this examination is relatively simple. It is the
first version of more complex models that we are currrently developing. Our plan is to
expand this model beyond MIT, using this initial approach as a proof of concept. In terms of
the model’s structure, the current version lumps together all employed faculty in a single
stock, failing to account for the dynamics at play between three clearly defined stocks in the
faculty pipeline: assistant, associate, and full professors. Furthermore, stocks can be
separated by academic specialty. Although the total number of faculty members may remain
constant (1,000 in the case of MIT), there can be wide compensating swings up and down by
academic department. Including and examining these stocks is one of the next steps in our
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analysis. The applicability of Little’s Law for these future analyses remains relevant, as it
provides a coherent and correct framework for increasingly complex models.
Finally, future models will take into account the impacts that changes in the faculty pipeline
have in variables such as Ph.D. production and average duration of postdoc appointments—
factors that are critical for the continued availability of a motivated and trained higher-
education workforce. Gaining insight into these broader dynamics could ultimately assist
policy makers in understanding the possible outcomes of levers ranging from reaearch
funding to retirement laws, providing an analytical grounding before policies are
implemented.
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Figure 1.
The System Dynamics Model
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Figure 2.
Operationalization of Policy Shocks in Retirement Age and Exit Rate: (a) Change as a
Result of Removing Mandatory Retirement, and (b) Effect of 1996 Retirement Incentives
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Figure 3.
Graphs for Employed Professors Comparing Model Results (Blue) with Historical Data in
MIT (Red) Under Two Scenarios: with Constant (a) and with Nonconstant (b) Desired
Faculty Size
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Figure 4.
Simulation Results: Impact of Policy vs. Counterfactual
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Table 1
Illustrative Milestone Probabilities and Career Durations
Milestone Probability Years
1 P1 = 0.9* Y1 = 2
2 P2 = 0.74 Y2 = 4
3 P3 = 0.62 Y3 = 7
4 P4 = 0.95* Y4 = 20
5 P5 = 1 Y5 = 35
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Table 2
Goodness-of-Fit Measures Using the Calibrated Values for Employed Professors
Delay because of
faulty hiring
processes
Delay in professors’
adaptation to policy
changes
R-squared
Constant desired
faculty size
Variable desired
faculty size
5.7 years 8 years 0.57 0.94
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